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Preferred Pharmacy Networks: Health Care Savings on the Margins
Summary
While policymakers have talked a lot recently about finding a comprehensive fix for escalating health care
costs, such as Medicare-for-all, many economists have been exploring the possibility that the answer for
excessive health care spending may rest instead in series of smaller adjustments. This issue brief presents
research on one such small fix: preferred pharmacy networks. This is a relatively new tool whereby health
insurers aim to steer consumers to lower cost “preferred” pharmacies, where insurers are able to negotiate
lower drug prices. The research concludes that preferred pharmacy contracting results in a roughly 1 percent
decrease in Medicare Part D drug costs among plans utilizing this tool—a fact that should be encouraging to
policymakers concerned about reigning in costs, especially in light of other research demonstrating that health
care consumers do not shop around for lower priced care. If this practice of “steering” consumers toward lower
cost drugs were applied to the entire pharmaceutical industry, the savings could be much greater.
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Preferred Pharmacy Networks: 
Health Care Savings on the Margins
Ashley Swanson, PhD
Health care spending in the U.S. reached $3.5 trillion—$10,739 per person— 
in 2017, or nearly one-fifth of GDP.1  The high cost of health care has been a 
staple campaign issue for several presidential cycles, and 2020 is shaping up to  
be no exception. 
According to a recent Washington Post article, most 
of the current Democratic candidates for President 
now support Medicare-for-all or some form of public 
option to expand health care coverage.2  These are the 
types of big ideas that policymakers often embrace in 
the face of problems as large and seemingly intractable 
as improving health care affordability and expand-
ing insurance coverage. However, as research on the 
behavior of health care providers, insurers, and con-
sumers has demonstrated time and again, the devil 
may be in the details.
Yale economist Fiona Scott Morton noted in a 
New York Times article last summer that the “big” 
fix to excessive health care spending may, in fact, be a 
series of much smaller fixes.3  As Scott Morton said, “I 
think focusing on the forest misses the fact that there 
are trees encroaching out of the forest. And we need 
to start cutting them down.” Throughout the vari-
ous industries that support the American health care 
system, opportunities for such savings abound. For 
example, in Scott Morton’s recent work on “surprise” 
out-of-network billing for emergency care, an arbitra-
tion policy remedy reduced out-of-network billing by 
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34 percent and lowered in-network 
emergency physician payments by 
9 percent.4  In a similar vein, Einav, 
Finkelstein, and Mahoney (2018) 
studied the incentives of long-term 
care hospitals (LTCH) in the Medi-
care program and found that restruc-
turing Medicare contracts could 
generate savings of about 5% of total 
payments to LTCHs.5  Dafny, Ody, 
and Schmitt (2017) found that the use 
of copay coupons for branded pre-
scription drugs increased drug spend-
ing by $700 million to $2.7 billion 
during 2007 and 2010.6  The policy 
fixes suggested by these results would 
have limited effects on overall health 
care spending in the U.S., but a few 
million (or billion) dollars of reduced 
waste here or increased savings there 
can begin to add up. 
In my own research, I have discov-
ered another example of “1%” savings 
—and perhaps something even more 
valuable, as I explain in this Issue 
Brief. In joint work with Amanda 
Starc, an economist at Northwest-
ern, I examined selective pharmacy 
contracting, which is a relatively new 
practice used by health insurers to 
lower the drug prices that their private 
insurance plans pay to pharmacies.7  
We find that when insurance plan 
enrollees’ out-of-pocket prices are 
transparent—in this case, the prices 
are copays charged to Medicare Part 
D plan enrollees—health care con-
sumers can sometimes be steered to 
lower cost “preferred” pharmacies. 
On the other hand, these preferred 
pharmacy networks reduce the 
comprehensiveness of enrollees’ drug 
plans, which is a very real welfare loss 
for consumers. Ultimately, given the 
steering we observe in practice, and 
given the price differentials observed 
between preferred and non-preferred 
plans, we find that preferred pharmacy 
contracting results in a roughly 1 
percent decrease in Medicare Part D 
drug costs among plans utilizing this 
tool. 
MEDICARE PART D TARGETS 
PHARMACIES’ MARKET 
POWER
The rising cost of drugs in the 
United States is the focus of much 
attention from economists, patient 
advocates, and policymakers.8  While 
much of this attention is directed 
toward pharmaceutical manufacturers, 
research has found that pharmacies 
are able to realize significant margins 
when they have the power to foreclose 
access to certain products.9  Pharmacy 
companies are quite concentrated 
and often do have significant market 
power, with five companies command-
ing over 60 percent of prescription 
revenues.10  
Preferred pharmacy networks are 
a relatively new tool for combatting 
pharmacy market power, analogous to 
plans’ historical use of drug formular-
ies to combat manufacturers’ market 
power. Researchers have argued that 
the introduction of Medicare Part D 
in 2003 lowered the price of drugs 
by increasing insurer market power 
(through the use of formularies) rela-
tive to that of drug manufacturers.11  
That market power shift, along with 
a turn toward generic drugs, has led 
to program costs lower than fore-
casted when this government benefit 
was passed into law. This is not to say 
that Part D insurers (or, more accu-
rately, the pharmacy benefit managers 
(PBMs) serving as insurers’ imperfect 
proxies) act as perfect agents of enroll-
ees, but rather that they are incentiv-
ized to reduce drug costs. Indeed, 
drug prices in Part D plans increased 
only about 2 percent between 2007 
and 2010, although plan premiums 
grew by 62.8 percent.12 
Medicare Part D stipulates that 
prescription drug coverage be pro-
vided to elderly Americans by private 
health insurers. Enrollees are able to 
1  Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), available 
at https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-and-
systems/statistics-trends-and-reports/nationalhealthex-
penddata/index.html.
2  Kevin Uhrmacher et al., “Where 2020 Democrats Stand on 
Medicare-for-all,” The Washington Post, accessed on April 
30, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/
politics/policy-2020/medicare-for-all/.
3  Margot Sanger-Katz, “Taming the Cost of Health Care 1% 
at a Time,” The New York Times, August 30, 2018.
4  Cooper, Scott Morton & Shekita (2018), “Surprise! Out-of-
Network Billing for Emergency Care in the United States,” 
NBER Working Paper 23623.
5  Einav, Finkelstein & Mahoney (2018), “Provider Incentives 
and Healthcare Costs: Evidence from Long-term care Hos-
pitals,” Econometrica, Vol. 86, No. 6, available at https://
economics.mit.edu/files/16464.
6  Dafny, Ody & Schmitt (2017), “When Discounts Raise 
Costs: The Effect of Copay Coupons on Generic Utilization,” 
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, Vol. 9, No. 2, 
pp. 91-123.
7  Amanda Starc & Ashley Swanson (2018), “Preferred 
Pharmacy Networks and Drug Costs,” NBER Working Paper 
24862.
8  See, e.g., Howard, D., Bach, P., Berndt, E. & Conti, R. 
(2015), “Pricing in the Market for Anticancer Drugs,” Jour-
nal of Economic Perspectives 29(1), 139–162.
9  Dubois, P. & Saethre, M. (2018), “On the Effect of Parallel 
Trade on Manufacturers’ and Retailers’ Profits in the Phar-
maceutical Sector,” TSE Working Paper (18-883).
10 Statista, “Top U.S. pharmacies ranked by prescription drugs 
market share in 2018,” available at https://www.statista.
com/statistics/734171/pharmacies-ranked-by-rx-market-
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choose from dozens of plans offered 
in their local geographic markets, and 
nearly 41 million of the 57 million 
people on Medicare (71 percent) were 
enrolled in a Part D plan in 2016.13  
Though offered by private insurers, 
Part D is a government benefit and 
is strictly regulated by the federal 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS). CMS mandates cov-
erage generosity of plans in terms of 
actuarial value, types of drugs covered, 
and pharmacy network breadth.14  
The pharmacy networks designed 
by plans in the Medicare Part D 
program may exclude independent 
pharmacies or entire pharmacy chains, 
such that enrollees are not able to use 
plan coverage for prescription fills 
at those pharmacies. However, Part 
D plans are limited in their ability 
to entirely exclude pharmacies due 
to network adequacy standards.15  
Another lever available to plans is 
that a pharmacy can be designated 
as preferred or non-preferred in a 
plan’s network, where preferred status 
implies reduced out-of-pocket costs to 
enrollees. Critically, network adequacy 
standards do not apply to the pre-
ferred network, so preferred pharmacy 
networks can be much more restrictive 
than plans’ overall networks. This dis-
tinction prompted CMS to investigate 
Part D preferred network coverage 
in 2015. The investigation by CMS 
found that plans’ overall networks 
met or exceeded the statutory access 
standard, but one in ten preferred 
networks offered sufficient preferred 
pharmacy access to fewer than 40 
percent of urban beneficiaries in their 
plans’ service areas.16  
Both plans and pharmacies face 
important trade-offs in their negotia-
tions over prices and network status. 
From the pharmacies’ perspective, 
plans may steer additional consumer 
demand to a specific pharmacy or 
pharmacy chain in exchange for 
retail price discounts. From the plans’ 
perspective, restrictive networks allow 
plans to steer consumers to lower cost 
pharmacies, and the threat of exclu-
sion could lead to a lower negotiated 
price at a given pharmacy. However, if 
consumers have strong preferences for 
broad networks, narrower networks 
will reduce enrollment. These mecha-
nisms rely on consumer demand being 
responsive to differential copays, and 
this may not be true if a large subset 
of consumers is insulated from cost 
sharing. It is this set of trade-offs that 
we quantified in our research.
STEERING (SOMETIMES) 
WORKS, BUT CONSUMERS 
PREFER TO PAY FOR CHOICE
Medicare Part D presents perhaps 
a best-case scenario for analyzing the 
welfare trade-offs inherent in selective 
contracting. In the health econom-
ics literature, numerous studies have 
found that health care consumers do 
not “shop.”17  However, prescription 
drug needs are more predictable than, 
say, the need for inpatient hospital 
care, and frequent, repeated interac-
tion with retail pharmacies implies 
that enrollees are likely aware at the 
plan choice stage of the relative con-
venience and cost of nearby pharma-
cies.
While only 13 percent of sample 
plans used preferred pharmacy net-
works in 2011, this rose to 70 per-
cent in 2014. The copay differentials 
between preferred and non-preferred 
pharmacies ranged from $6-$8 per 
30-day supply for the most popular 
plan formulary tiers, indicating that 
the incentive to use preferred pharma-
cies within preferred-network plans 
was substantial. However, these copay 
differentials did not generally apply 
for low-income subsidy (LIS) enroll-
ees, who account for about 20 percent 
of plan spending in our sample. For 
example, for many LIS enrollees, the 
maximum copay was $2.55 per 30-day 
share-in-us/.
11 Duggan, M. & Scott Morton, F. (2010), “The Impact of 
Medicare Part D on Pharmaceutical Prices and Utilization,” 
American Economic Review 100(1), 590–607.
12 Ho, K., Hogan, J. & Scott Morton, F. (2017), “The Impact of 
Consumer Inattention on Insurer Pricing in the Medicare 
Part D Program,” RAND Journal of Economics 48(4), 
877–905.
13 Medicare-eligible individuals can acquire prescription drug 
coverage through standalone Part D plans or can obtain 
drug coverage bundled with medical and hospital coverage 
in the form of “Medicare Advantage” plans. We limit our 
analysis to standalone Part D plans in this study, covering 
about 60 percent of enrollees. Enrollment numbers from 
Hoadley, J., Cubanski, J. & Neuman, T. (2016), “Medicare 
Part D in 2016 and Trends over Time,” Report, Kaiser Fam-
ily Foundation.
14 Enrollees are entitled to basic coverage of prescription 
drugs by a plan with equal or greater actuarial value to a 
standard Part D plan with a deductible, an initial coverage 
region with 75 percent coverage, another coverage gap 
(known as the “donut hole”), and a catastrophic region 
with 95 percent coverage. The majority of Part D enrollees 
are not enrolled in standard plans, but rather in actuarially 
equivalent or “enhanced” plans with non-standard deduct-
ibles and tiered copays, so that cost-sharing varies across 
drugs and pharmacies.
15 CMS evaluates Part D retail pharmacy networks against 
standards established for the U.S. military’s TRICARE 
programs: e.g., at least 90 percent of beneficiaries must 
reside within two miles of a network retail pharmacy. The 
analogous standards for suburban and rural areas are 90 
percent within five miles, and 70 percent within fifteen 
NOTES 
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supply for a generic drug in 2014. 
Both preferred and non-preferred 
pharmacy copays generally exceed 
this maximum, effectively removing 
the copay differential and, in turn, the 
incentive to visit preferred pharmacies. 
Utilizing data on prescription 
drug events, plan demand, pharmacy 
demand, plan characteristics, and 
pricing from CMS, we observed every 
prescription fill for the years 2011-
2014 for a random 10 percent sample 
of all Medicare eligible individuals. 
Our results cover both branded and 
generic drugs, and in some cases focus 
particular attention on the market for 
generic prescription drugs because, 
strikingly, there is significant price 
dispersion even within extremely 
narrowly defined products and even 
within generic drugs. (Evidence of 
substantial generic price variation sug-
gests that the issue of market power 
in generics be revisited, even though 
generic drug prices typically receive 
little research or policy attention.18) 
Our research into preferred phar-
macy networks reveals three key take-
aways. First, preferred network status 
has a large positive effect on pharmacy 
demand, which is largest for non-
LIS enrollees and for relatively low 
cost enrollees. Specifically, preferred 
pharmacies receive eight percent 
greater market share among non-LIS 
enrollees (16 percent overall) due to 
preferred status alone. In contrast, LIS 
enrollees and very high-cost enrollees 
are less responsive to preferred status. 
Subsidies for LIS enrollees are crucial 
for safeguarding their access to health 
care products and services, but it is 
useful for policymakers to understand 
the trade-offs involved—even if only 
for forecasting purposes—when LIS 
and non-LIS enrollees are pooled in 
the same plans.
Second, plans face additional 
trade-offs when setting the compre-
hensiveness of their networks. Plans 
with more comprehensive preferred 
networks receive greater enrollment, 
all else equal, and the average enrollee 
is willing to pay an additional $82 
annually for a unit increase in network 
comprehensiveness (approximately a 
standard deviation). 
Third, due to subsidies and cost-
sharing structures that limit enrollees’ 
exposure to preferred pharmacy copay 
differentials, the increased costs from 
a plan (hypothetically) transition-
ing to fully comprehensive preferred 
networks would be relatively small. 
On balance, the results imply that 
preferred network contracting saved 
plans $9 per enrollee-year (1 per-
cent annual savings for the average 
enrollee-year) between 2012-2014. 
This works out to approximately $150 
million in increased costs if preferred 
network plans were to become fully 
comprehensive. Notably, these modest 
cost increases would be smaller than 
the consumer welfare benefits associ-
ated with moving to comprehensive 
preferred networks ($16 per enrollee-
year), given enrollees’ revealed pref-
erence to pay ex ante for network 
coverage. 
Our findings raise the question 
of why insurers offer limited network 
plans at all, when the cost savings are 
significantly less than the value of 
expanded access. Three features of this 
market could explain the discrepancy. 
First, although preferred network 
plans do not attract enrollees who 
take fewer drugs, our results indicate 
that the enrollees in plans with more 
restrictive networks purchased cheaper 
drugs. Plans could therefore be using 
network breadth as a screening tool 
to attract healthy enrollees. Second, 
limited pharmacy network plans 
are a relatively recent phenomenon. 
Thus, insurers may be experiment-
ing, and the market may not have 
been in equilibrium during the period 
we studied.19  Finally—and of most 
interest to policymakers concerned 
about public health care spend-
NOTES 
miles, respectively CMS. 
16 CMS (2015b), “Analysis of Part D beneficiary access to 
preferred cost sharing pharmacies (PCSPs),” Technical 
report, Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services.
17 See, e.g., Chernew, Cooper, Larson-Hallock & Scott Morton 
(2019), “Are Health Care Services Shoppable? Evidence 
from the Consumption of Lower-Limb MRI Scans,” NBER 
Working Paper 24869.
18 The mean price of branded drugs is 9-15 times as large 
as that for generic drugs, which accounts for the dispro-
portionate policy attention given to the less-frequently 
prescribed branded drugs. 
19 Snook, T. D. & Filipek, T. M. (2011), “Pharmacy Benefit 
Management: Pros and Cons of Various Approaches”, Mil-
liman White Paper.
20 Apoorva Rama (2019), “National Health Expenditures, 
2017: The slowdown in spending growth continues,” 
American Medical Association, https://www.washington-
post.com/graphics/politics/policy-2020/medicare-for-all/.
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ing—the threat of exclusion from a 
preferred network may allow insurers 
to negotiate larger discounts within a 
pharmacy. Indeed, our analyses sug-
gest that drug cost savings associated 
with selective contracting are driven 
in part by restrictive plans steering 
enrollees to lower cost pharmacies and 
in part by restrictive plans extracting 
larger discounts from pharmacies. In 
future work, we will explore this issue 
further.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The fact that we discovered any 
ability to steer consumers in their 
health care purchases is surprising. 
Selective pharmacy contracting in 
Medicare Part D plans is undoubt-
edly a niche topic. But the reality 
that steering in a health care context 
sometimes works in practice should be 
encouraging to policymakers inter-
ested in reining in health care costs, 
particularly the drug prices paid by 
Medicare enrollees. 
If this steering result were to be 
applied to the entire $333 billion 
pharmaceutical drug industry,20 the 
savings could be much greater. Small 
fix or not, this targeted attempt by 
Medicare Part D insurance companies 
to lower prescription drug prices is yet 
another example for policymakers of 
how trimming health care costs wher-
ever possible might be an essential 
part of any “big” solution.
publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu
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